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The People’s Republic of China, during the second half of the twentieth century,has
been repeatedly affected by social and political upheavals associated with govern-
ment policies. These have produced strong but unexpected impacts on Chinese
demographic patterns. Many of these policies are of the sorts that alter reproductive
costs and benefits. This study examines patterns in Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai,
three provinces with differing ecological, geographic, and economic characteristics.
Government policies affected the three populations differentially; this was evident at
both aggregate and individual levels. The Great Leap Forward and subsequent
famine created higher birth deficits and mortality among the largely rural popula-
tions of Hebei and Shaanxi than the more urban Shanghai. In contrast, the Cultural
Revolution and family planning resulted in lower fertility levels for women in
Shanghai. The population history of China during the second half of last century thus
reflects strong state interventions in the lives of its citizens. Government policies,
along with regional variations in geographic, social, and economic conditions,
strongly influence individual access to resources in China. Variations in timing and
intensity of women’s reproductive patterns reflect differential access to resources
and subsequent trade-offs.
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INTRODUCTION
Populations grow and affect environments; environments in turn
influence the population (demographic) patterns. Interactions between
population and environment are the aggregate outcomes of individual
behaviors. Better understanding of individual lifetimes and behavior should
lead to better understanding of population–environment dynamics.
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Organisms, including humans, experience a series of trade-offs among
life history traits, such as age and size at maturity, allocation between
somatic and reproductive effort, age schedules of birth and death, and
number and size of offspring. Thus, life histories represent the outcomes of
competing costs and benefits associated with different activities at any point
in life (Daan & Tinbergen, 1997;Lessells, 1991; Low, 1998; Roff, 1992;
Stearns, 1992). Moreover, life histories do not operate in a vacuum, but
evolve in response to environmental pressures, phylogenetic constraints,
and historical particulars (see Low, 2000; Roff, 2002). Humans live in
multifaceted environments that encompass ecological, social, political, and
cultural settings. As a result of this complexity, human life histories can be
more diverse than many other species (Low, 2000).
Life history characteristics related to reproduction are centrally
important. Fertility variation has long been a focus of interest among biol-
ogists, demographers, and anthropologists (e.g., Bongaarts & Potter, 1983;
Clarke & Low, 2001; Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Low & Clarke, 1993; Low,
Clarke, & Lockridge, 1992). Variations in resource availability, reflecting
different social and ecological conditions, tend to give rise to variations in
reproductive patterns in different environments (e.g., Hill & Hurtado, 1996;
Kaplan, 1994; Low & Clarke, 1993).
Chinese life history data provide a unique opportunity to expand this
theoretical exploration. China in the second half of the twentieth century
has experienced dramatic (even shocking) social, cultural, and political
transformation as a result of various government policies (Meisner, 1999;
Schoppa, 2002). Many of these policy shifts are of the sort that alter
reproductive costs and benefits. Examples of these transformative experi-
ences include the extremely rapid agricultural collectivization and urban
industrialization of the 1950s and early 1960s (with attendant social dis-
location, famine, etc.); and the violent class warfare encouraged during the
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Many government policies of these
periods were unprecedented in human history (Meisner, 1999; Schoppa,
2002); some of them created novel environments — and subsequent
reproductive responses — for the Chinese people.
In light of the vast ecological variation within China, as well as tem-
poral variation due to various historical events, we would expect Chinese
women born in different eras and from different parts of the country to
respond differently in their fertility patterns. Differences in their timing and
intensity of reproduction should reflect variations in their backgrounds and
experiences.
Here, I focus on women from two rural provinces (Hebei and Shaanxi)
and one urban municipality (Shanghai) in China. To illuminate how
300
POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT
government policies affect populations, I first examine changes in birth and
death rates in these three areas during the first 50 years (1949–1999) of the
People’s Republic of China. I then compare age-specific martial fertilities
for women of a representative sample from each region. I show that at the
aggregate level, fluctuations in birth and death rates responded closely to
shifts in government policies. At the individual level, these policies pro-
duced shifts in fertility patterns for women of different age cohorts.
MAO’S CHINA AND BEYOND
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formally established under
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on October 1, 1949.
At that time, the PRC had a territory slightly larger than that of the U. S., and
a population of roughly 542 million people. China’s territory has not grown
in the intervening 54 years, but its population has more than doubled,
standing now at approximately 1.3 billion.
From 1949 until his death in 1976, Mao Zedong dominated the CCP.
Mao was at the helm when the CCP implemented land reform, agricultural
collectivization, nationalization of industry, nation-wide ideological
indoctrination, and numerous other changes. Following Mao’s death and a
difficult period of transition, Deng Xiaoping emerged in 1978 as the pre-
eminent leader of CCP (until his death in early 1997). Under Deng’s lead-
ership, the CCP implemented a series of modernization efforts (known as
the Four Modernization), the one-child population control policy, and a
new system of agricultural and industrial production incentives.
Consequently, between 1950 and 1985, Chinese people experienced a
series of unprecedented social, economic, and political upheavals due to
government reforms and movements; indeed, the period is often describe as
a vast experiment in revolutionary social engineering. Based on these
fundamental social and political events, the first 35 some years of the PRC
can be divided into the following periods.
The Transition to Socialism (TTS): 1949–1957
The political construction led by the governing CCP during this period
emphasized economic development and social equality. Land reform and
the newly introduced marriage law were meant to improve the social status
of women and peasants, freeing both from a ‘‘long-standing exploitation’’
by the feudal patriarchal establishment (but see Johnson, 1983). Income dif-
ferentials were compressed between white-collar and blue-collar jobs, and
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between mental and manual labor, as a result of the ideological struggle
against so-called capitalist elements (Lin & Xie, 1988; Parish, 1984). The
period of 1953–1957 marked China’s First Five-Year Plan, characterized by
collectivization of agriculture, industrialization, and political centralization.
Preliminary collectivization of agriculture was 90% completed by the end
of 1956. In addition, the government nationalized banking, many indus-
tries, and trade. Private enterprise was virtually abolished (Worden, Savada,
& Dolan, 1987).
Improvements in health and economic conditions led to an increase in
life expectancy at birth from 36 years in 1950 to 57 years in 1957.
Generally speaking, the first 8 years of the PRC are seen as being the most
successful period of CCP rule under Mao’s control (Schoppa, 2002).
Great Leap Forward and Famine (GLF): 1958–1961
The Great Leap Forward was an ambitious attempt by the communist
government to accomplish the economic and technical development of
China at a faster pace and with greater results than other nations. People’s
communes were created in the countryside and in a few urban areas. By the
fall of 1958, some 23,500 communes, averaging 5000 households each,
were established. In this massive societal reorganization, the individual
commune was planned as a self-supporting community (Worden et al.,
1987).
Unfortunately, the Great Leap Forward turned out to be an economic
failure (Schoppa, 2002). One consequence was a striking decline of grain
production in three consecutive years (1959–1961), resulting in food
shortages and drastic deterioration of the standard of living. The combina-
tion of government policy and natural disasters contributed to a devastating
famine of 1959–1961 (Ashton, Hill, Piazza, & Zeitz, 1984). The hastily
implemented agricultural policy led to a decrease in agricultural labor
productivity and a reduction of cultivated areas, which in turn reduced
grain outputs. At the same time, droughts in north China and floods in south
China between 1959 and 1960 further aggravated the decline in agricultural
production.
Further, the government was misinformed about actual grain outputs; it
increased grain exports in 1959 and 1960. Exaggerated food production
reports by local officials led to excessive government procurement and
export. Rural populations experienced worse grain shortages than urban
populations in famine years (Ashton et al., 1984); urban populations were
relatively insulated from the crisis because state-controlled stockpiles were
used to supplement their food supplies. Three years of famine (1959–1961)
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led to massive fertility deficits and excess deaths, particularly in the rural
areas (Peng, 1987).
Recovery and Readjustment (RR): 1962–1965
Faced with the collapse of the commune system, CCP leaders made
extensive changes aimed at decentralizing economic and agricultural
decision-making. They shifted administrative and economic planning from
the commune system to small-scale production teams in 1962, and much
emphasis was placed on locally realistic, efficient planning. Ideological
fervor and mass movements no longer dictated production goals and
management practices. By early 1965, China was well on its way to
economic recovery (Worden et al., 1987).
Mao, however, continued to believe that the recently restored material
incentives corrupted society. To deter capitalist trends, Mao launched the
Socialist Education Movement during this period: It placed emphasis on
restoring ideological purity, re-infusing revolutionary fervor into the party
and government bureaucracies, and intensifying class struggle (Worden
et al., 1987).
The Cultural Revolution (CR I, CR II): 1966–1976
The Socialist Education Movement paved the way for the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976. The particularly violent first
phase of the Cultural Revolution (CR I) spanned from 1966 to 1969
(Schoppa, 2002), although sporadic armed combat between rival groups
continued through 1971 (Blayo, 1992). Mao believed that the CCP itself was
becoming too bureaucratic and conservative. He used the Red Guards,
composed of middle-school and university students, to shatter the party
organization, to rekindle revolutionary enthusiasm, and to destroy so-called
counter-revolutionary values (Worden et al., 1987). Established cadres and
professionals were removed from their positions and replaced with new
ones (workers, peasants, and soldiers) who lacked education, professional
training, and experience to manage the specific tasks at hand (Lin & Xie,
1988). The result was massive civil disorder, punctuated by armed combat
among rival Red Guard gangs and between gangs and other social groups
(Worden et al., 1987).
A new ‘‘sent down’’ movement also went into effect, in which intel-
lectuals and scholars were drafted for manual labor in order to re-educate
them, and purge from them any ‘‘bourgeois’’ influences. The education
system was disrupted in the countryside, and completely shut down in most
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cities. No new students were admitted to universities from 1966 to 1969.
Large numbers of urban youth were sent away for ‘‘re-education.’’ Over
20 million university, high school, and middle-school students were sent to
the countryside and border regions (Lin & Xie, 1988). Meanwhile, a
countering rural–urban migration by an estimated 16 million people ful-
filled the need for military support and factory workers in cities. The results
were dramatic crossovers in social stratification and mobility, with little
correlation between education and occupational attainment during 1966–
1976 (e.g., Lin & Xie, 1988).
From 1971 to 1977, there was a shift in emphasis (CR II). During 1971–
1973, a third family planning program was introduced after the breakdown
of the first two family planning campaigns (in 1958 and 1966). Unlike pre-
vious campaigns, the stated goal of this third campaign was very clearly to
promote three norms known as ‘‘later, longer, and fewer’’: Later marriage,
longer birth intervals, and fewer children (Peng, 1991). In practical terms,
this meant the marriage age for women was recommended to be 23 in rural
areas and 25 in urban areas. The corresponding ages were 25 and 27 for
men. Three–five years between births were regarded as ideal (Peng, 1991).
Until 1977, the ‘‘fewer’’ part of the campaign aimed at three children
per couple in rural areas and two children in urban areas. After 1977, rural
couples were also limited to two children (Wolf, 1985). Moreover, this
program also instituted a birth ‘‘quota’’ system. The number of births
planned for each year by the central government was broken down among
administrative units at different levels. Women eligible to give birth were
eventually selected by their work unit or production team (Blayo,
1992;Peng, 1991, p. 38). This program later expanded and became the one
child policy in 1979 (Blayo, 1992).
The Post Mao Period (PMP) and the Onset of the One Child Policy
(OCP): 1977
The year 1977 marked the beginning of a new social order in China,
followingMao’s death in the fall of 1976. Attention was given to the so-called
Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science
and technology). New agricultural policies, such as the self-responsibility
system, allowed peasants to produce on their own initiative (Worden et al.,
1987). At the same time, private industries and services started growing. The
attainment of economic goals became themeasure of the success or failure of
policies and individual leadership (Worden et al., 1987).
In 1979, with a population of 975 million, the one-child policy was
announced, although it was not carried out vigorously until 1980. It was
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intended to control long-term population growth and stimulate the viability
of China’s new economy. Economic incentives and disincentives were used
to persuade people to comply. These varied from province to province,
between rural and urban areas, and across time. The allocation of economic
rewards became a burden for many poor rural communes, because com-
munes were ultimately responsible for providing such rewards. In effect, the
one-child policy proved to be locally costly; it faced high levels of oppo-
sition by individuals from all walks of life, especially in rural areas (Peng,
1991). The Chinese government has never been able to carry out the
one-child policy without resistance (Wasserstrom, 1984).
Six years into the implementation of the one-child policy, major
modifications occurred: various exceptions were introduced allowing
people to have a second child. For example, if the first child was a girl or
was disabled, a second child was allowed (Peng, 1991). The one-child




I chose to work with Hebei, Shaanxi (two more rural provinces) and
Shanghai (an urban municipality) because they have different ecological,
demographic, and economic characteristics (Figure 1). Political events
should affect people’s lives differently in these three regions.
Hebei, a coastal province on the North China Plain has an area of
187,700 km2. The 1990 estimated population was around 62 million.
Various crops, such as wheat, cotton, corn, rice, tobacco, peanuts, and
sesame grow on the alluvial plain of eastern Hebei. The rugged Taihang
Mountain Area in western Hebei, besides growing cereal crops, also pro-
duces walnuts, persimmons, dates, apricots, and a variety of fruits. Hebei
has sizeable reserves of coal, iron, and petroleum. Shijiazhuang, leaning
against the Taihang Range and situated in the middle south of the province,
is a major city and the capital of Hebei province. It is one of the important
railway hubs in China with an estimated population around 8.6 million in
the mid - 1990s.
Shaanxi, an inland province on the middle reaches of the Yellow River,
is located in the center of China, covering an area of 206,000 km2. Its
population was estimated at approximately 33 million in 1990. It has three
distinctive landforms from north to south. Northern Shaanxi belongs to the
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Loess Plateau with an elevation of 800–1300 m, and accounts for 45% of
the province. Soil erosion in this area over the centuries has created many
crisscrossing gullies. Northern Shaanxi is a farming-pastoral area producing
corn, sorghum, millet and sheep. The Central Shaanxi Plain (i.e., Guanz-
hong Plain) has an elevation of 520 m on average and is famous for growing
wheat and cotton. Southern Shaanxi covers the Qinling and Daba moun-
tainous regions, with an elevation between 1000 and 3000 m. This region
accounts for 36% of the province. It is a subtropical farming area which
grows rice, peas, soybeans, rape, tangerines, tea, sugar cane, lacquer,
bamboo, and medicinal herbs. Shaanxi is rich in its mineral deposits,
including coal, gold, and molybdenum. The province also has a large
reserve of natural gas in the north. Xi’an, located in the Guanzhong Plain, is
the largest city and the capital of Shaanxi. Xi’an is a main industrial and
tourism center for the province. The population of Xi’an was estimated
around 6.6 million in the mid-1990s.
FIGURE 1. Geographic locations of Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai.
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Shanghai, a coastal metropolis in the southeast, covers an area of
6340 km2. Situated just south of the Yangtze Estuary, Shanghai is one of the
largest ports in China and biggest cities in the world. The estimated popu-
lation of Shanghai was about 13 million in 1990. Although, it is mainly
urban, Shanghai still has a sizeable rural population (Dankert & van
Ginneken, 1991). The fertile Yangtze River Delta, near Shanghai, has long
been important to China’s agriculture.
Shanghai consistently has had the highest population density, while
Shaanxi has had the lowest among the three study areas (Wang, 2000).
Before the famine of 1960, Shanghai had the highest natural growth rate
among the three. Since then, its natural growth rate has been the lowest.
Shanghai has had the lowest fertility rate among the three since the 1960s,
while Shaanxi has maintained a higher rate than Hebei most of the time.
Shanghai has the highest per capita GDP. Between the early 1950s and
1970s, Hebei and Shaanxi had comparable per capita GDPs; however,
Hebei has exceeded Shaanxi in its per capita GDP since the late 1970s. All
these characteristics suggest that Shanghai is the most, and Shaanxi the
least, developed region among the three.
Besides socio-economic variation, political upheavals had differing
degrees of impacts on people in these three regions. During the Great Leap
Forward famine (1959–1961), rural populations in Hebei and Shaanxi suf-
fered more than urban population in Shanghai. On the other hand, the
Cultural Revolution (especially during its early phase) was most disruptive
for people’s lives in Shanghai. The effectiveness of the family planning
program also differs among the three areas—it has been most successful in
Shanghai but least successful in Shaanxi. Although inadvertently, these
political events influenced individual access to resources and the costs and
benefits of family-formation decisions (such as marriage, birth) directly.
Data
I use data from the 1985 China In-depth Fertility Survey (IDFS), phase I,
carried out by the Department of Population Statistics of the State Statistical
Bureau (SSB) of the PRC, in cooperation with the International Statistical
Institute, Voorburg, The Netherlands. The IDFS was largely inspired by the
example of the World Fertility Survey carried out between 1973 and 1985.
Details of survey methodology and main findings were published in the
Principle Report (SSB, 1986a).
The IDFS, phase I, covered Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai. For each
region, the IDFS used a stratified, multistage sampling design to cover the
whole area, in the hope that information collected from the survey would be
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representative. The IDFS questionnaire consisted of three parts: a commu-
nity questionnaire, a household questionnaire to determine eligible
respondents (women ever married and aged 15–49 years), and an individ-
ual questionnaire to interview each eligible woman. The individual ques-
tionnaire included eight major sections, including interview charac-
teristics, respondent’s and relatives’ background, respondent’s marital his-
tory, respondent’s fertility history, knowledge and use of contraception,
respondent’s fertility preferences, fertility summary, birth history, and
pregnancy history. A total of 13,307 married women of childbearing age
were interviewed: 5080 from Hebei, 4084 from Shaanxi, and 4143 from
Shanghai (SSB, 1986b; see also Dankert & van Ginneken, 1991).
Although the survey covered women aged 15–49 years, I excluded
women below age 20 because they comprised very small portions of
respondents from Hebei (0.7%) and Shaanxi (1.2%); and no respondent
from Shanghai was younger than 20 (see Dankert & van Ginneken, 1991,
Table 2). I divided women in my sample into six age groups (20–24, 25–29,
30–34, 35–39, 40–44, and 45–49) for age-specific fertility analysis.
RESULTS
Government Decisions Can Affect Reproductive Benefits and Costs
Birth and death rates fluctuated in response to government policies for
the three study areas (and for China as a whole) between 1949 and 1999
(Figure 2). There were both within-area and between-area variations
through time.
During the Transition period (TTS: 1949–1957), falling birth rates
across Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai coincided with the beginning of the
first family-planning program in 1956. However, birth rates rose again when
FIGURE 2. Birth rates and death rates for Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai, and
China as a whole, 1949–1999. TTS: transition to socialism, 1949–1957;
GLF: great leap forward, 1958–1961; R&R: recovery and readjustment,
1962–1965; CR I: first half of the cultural revolution, 1966–1971; CR II:
second half of the cultural revolution, 1972–1976, overlapping with the
launch of the later-longer-fewer family-planning campaign; PMP: post mao
period, 1977–1979; OCP: one child policy era, 1980. (Source: Compre-







the political winds turned against birth control, during the Anti-rightist
campaign of 1957. Meanwhile, death rates declined in a relatively steady
fashion. In general, people in Shanghai were much better off than those
from the rural provinces of Hebei and Shaanxi in terms of mortality.
During the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent famine (GLF:
1958–1961), birth rates dropped sharply in all study areas, reaching their
lowest point in 1961. Between 1958 and 1961, government birth-control
apparatuses ceased to function as well. Death rates climbed up precipi-
tously, especially among the largely rural populations of Hebei and
Shaanxi. Hebei and Shaanxi suffered more deaths than urbanized Shanghai
because of greater grain shortages in rural China.
As soon as the Leap and famine ended, fertility increased, reaching a
peak in 1963–1964. Birth rates remained relatively high during the
Recovery period (R&R: 1962–1965), although the trend was slightly nega-
tive. A second family-planning campaign was launched at the end of 1962
in response to the tremendous fertility surge after the famine. This campaign
was more successful among urban populations than rural ones, which in
part accounted for a much greater reduction in fertility for Shanghai than
Hebei and Shaanxi after 1963. In fact, family planning established a strong
footing in Shanghai during that time.
Death rates fell immediately after periods of massive famine deaths.
This was particularly true for Hebei and Shaanxi where famine was more
serious compared to Shanghai. However, it is not clear why Shaanxi suf-
fered an extremely high mortality level in 1964 (even higher than the
national average) when China was recovering from the Great Leap Forward
crisis.
The second family-planning campaign was disrupted by the inception
of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. As a result, there were upswings in
birth rates for Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai during the early phase of the
Cultural Revolution (CR I: 1966–1971). Alarmed by the soaring growth in
population, the Chinese government began to promote its third
family-planning campaign in 1971. Consequently, birth rates fell during
the second half of the Cultural Revolution (CR II: 1972–1976). Shaanxi
had a much higher mortality rate in the beginning of the Cultural Revo-
lution than did Hebei and Shanghai. In 1976, the final year of the Cultural
Revolution, a devastating earthquake leveled the city of Tangshan in
Hebei, creating a sudden upsurge in mortality level for Hebei (Figure 2).
After the Cultural Revolution, death rates remained relatively low and




After Mao’s death in 1976, China’s political focus shifted to economic
development instead of political struggle. The Chinese government deemed
population growth a serious threat to national economic development. In
1978, family planning became, for the first time, an article of the Chinese
Constitution (Peng, 1991). By now, the third family-planning program had
been very successful, lowering the natural increase rate by half compared
to when the program first started in 1971. Nevertheless, as large cohorts
born in the pre- and post-leap eras approached the age of marriage and
childbearing, the Chinese government was convinced that strong measures
were needed in order to speed up the process of modernization. Conse-
quently, the ‘‘one child per family’’ policy was put forward in 1979.
In the early 1980s, an increase in fertility rates took place across all
three study areas, despite the new one-child policy. This rise resulted
from a new marriage law in January 1981, which replaced the old
regulations implemented in 1950. The new law raised the legal minimum
age for marriage to 20 (from 18) for women, and 22 (from 20) for men
(Blayo, 1992; Peng, 1991). However, since at least the early 1970s
during the third family-planning program, the legal minimum age stipu-
lated by the 1950 marriage law had been ignored, largely replaced by
the local authority-recommended age of 23 for rural women and 25 for
their urban counterparts. Therefore, in practice, the new law of 1981
unexpectedly lowered the age at marriage and resulted in a wave of
relatively early marriage and motherhood (Figure 2; also see Blayo,
1992).
The decade of the1980s was a period of fertility ups and downs as the
one-child policy was being tested, modified, and reaffirmed. For example,
in 1984 the government issued a modification of the strict policy known in
Chinese as ‘‘open a small hole to block a big gap.’’ In essence, this modi-
fication allowed rural couples with real difficulties, or only one daughter, to
bear a second child. Local birth-planning authorities were given more
freedom in stipulating rules and setting population targets according to local
conditions.
However, the adjustments of the policy were not exercised without
contention. It was the center of a constant dispute between hard-liners and
liberals within the party (see Scharping, 2003). Since 1990, the advocates of
a hard-line one-child policy have held the upper hand in shaping China’s
population policy. Concerned about the high number of excess births from
the previous decade, they seized the opportunity to tighten birth-planning
(Scharping, 2003). The steady downward trend of the birth rates in Hebei,





The previous section examines the impacts of government decisions on
aggregate demographic patterns for each study area. However, these poli-
cies also affected individual fertility for women born in different eras (who
thus faced different social/political pressures during their reproductive
prime).
In all cohorts, women from both Hebei and Shaanxi (the more rural
provinces) had higher age-specific marital fertility rates (ASMFRs) than
Shanghai women (Figure 3). Regardless of region, women in the
45–49 years cohort had higher ASMFRs than women in any other cohorts
(although ASMFRs quickly converged for Shanghai women after age
30)—with the exception of the rates at age 20–24.
Women aged 45–49 in 1985 had their prime reproductive years before
the third family-planning program was in place. Thus, their fertility
remained high compared to women in younger cohorts (except in famine
years). Women aged 45–49 in this sample faced famine in 1960 when they
were 20–24 years old, which largely explains why they had lower ASMFRs
at such an age than the subsequent cohorts (Figure 3). Moreover, rural
populations experienced greater severity of grain shortages than urban
populations in famine years. Consequently, compared to Shanghai women,
those from rural regions (Hebei and Shaanxi) did suffer a greater degree of
reduction in their marital fertility at age 20–24.
Women aged 40–44 in 1985 were 20–24 years old in 1965 when
China was in recovery from the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the
subsequent great famine. Across regions, this group of women showed high
marital fertility at age 20–24 (Figure 3).
Women 35–39 years old in 1985 experienced the early phase of the
Cultural Revolution in 1970 when they were 20–24 years old. The Cultural
Revolution caused tremendous disruptions to the lives of young people,
especially in urban areas. Shanghai women in this cohort had lower marital
fertility at age 20–24 than women in the previous cohorts, including those
who went through the great famine at the same age (Figure 3c).
Regardless of regions, women’s marital fertility peaked at age 25–29 for
each cohort—except women who were 35–39 in 1985 (Figure 3).
Women in this particular cohort were 20–24 years old in 1970, and 25–29
years old in 1975. The relatively stable and low marital fertility rates at these
two times (especially for women from Hebei and Shanghai) were possibly
the results of delayed marriage, delayed parenthood, and reduced family































































































FIGURE 3. Age-specific marital fertility rate by cohorts and provinces.
(a) Hebei Province, (b) Shaanxi Province and (c) Shanghai.
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Women in the 30–34 and 25–29 years cohorts were 20–24 years old in
1975 and 1980, respectively. Across regions, women in both cohorts had
the lowest, and almost identical, marital fertility rates at age 20–24 (Fig-
ure 3). The low ASMFRs for women in these two young cohorts were the
results of the third family-planning program, first launched in early 1970s,
and the subsequent one-child policy in 1979.
DISCUSSION
During the second half of the 20th century, not only the history of
China, but people’s reproductive lives and resulting demographic patterns,
have been affected by a series of social and political upheavals. Govern-
ment policies, along with regional variations in geographic, social, and
economic conditions, strongly influenced individual access to resources in
China. Variations in timing and intensity of women’s reproductive patterns
reflect these differentials in their access to resources, and the kinds of trade-
offs they made subsequently.
Analyses of Chinese fertility patterns reveal tremendous regional vari-
ation. Fertility varies across all levels of regional and local divides. That is,
fertility differs at the provincial level (Peng, 1991; Poston, 1988), county
level (Poston & Jia, 1990), and all the way down to the production brigades
(Freedman, Xiao, Li, & Lavely ,1988). Moreover, the range of fertility vari-
ation within China is as broad as that for the entire world during the same
period. For example, in 1981, the lowest total fertility rate in China (e.g., 1.3
in Shanghai) was comparable to that for some of the most developed
countries like Denmark. Meanwhile, the highest rate in 1981 (4.4 for the
interior Guizhou province) was similar to rates of other populous devel-
oping countries such as Indonesia (Peng, 1991; Poston, 1988).
Other things being equal, delayed marriage inevitably leads to older
ages at first and subsequent births. In China, where marriage is universal for
women and childbearing outside marriage is very rare, age at marriage thus
is closely linked to fertility patterns (see also Peng, 1991). In this study,
Shanghai women married the latest; in other areas, urban women also
married later than their rural counterparts (see Ting, 2003).
Differentials in socioeconomic development, and the prominence and
effectiveness of the family-planning program (which promotes late marriage
among other things), account at least in part for differences in ages at
marriage among women from Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai in this study
(Ting, 2003). High degrees of economic development and family-planning
effort have been associated with delayed marriage in China (Peng, 1991) as
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elsewhere. Shanghai is the most, and Shaanxi the least, ‘‘developed’’ among
the three study sites (above). The family-planning program has gained a
strong footing in Shanghai since the 1960s. In general, family-planning also
was carried out earlier and more efficiently in Hebei than Shaanxi (Peng,
1991). In China as elsewhere, urban areas tend to be more economically
developed than rural areas, and family planning has typically been more
successful in urban than rural areas (Peng, 1991).
During the Great Leap Forward, droughts caused the loss of 54 % of the
crop in Shaanxi in 1959, and 60 % in Hebei in 1960 (Ashton et al., 1984).
Age-specific fertility rates fell for women in Shaanxi and Hebei as a result of
drought and famine. Similar situations have also been reported elsewhere
for a number of historical populations (e.g., Low, 1989; Low & Clarke,
1993; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981).
Changes in women’s age-specific fertility rates were not as dramatic in
Shanghai as in Hebei and Shaanxi, because the urban population was
insulated from the agrarian crisis through grain rationing systems and sup-
plements from state-controlled stockpiles (Ashton et al., 1984). Rather,
institutions such as the family-planning program have had larger effects on
age-specific fertility rates for women in Shanghai compared to women in
Hebei and Shaanxi. In Shanghai, age-specific fertility rates for women of
different age cohorts have converged quickly since 1970—a sign of the
effectiveness of the family-planning program.
China’s commitment to birth-planning and population control is
without precedent in world history. Family-planning was first written into
the constitution in 1978. In 1982, it became an indispensable part of
national policy. Moreover, the law on population and family-planning, the
first of its kind, was promulgated in December 2001; it went into effect in
September 2002. The law now provides a legal footing for the work on
family-planning nation-wide, and aims to stabilize China’s population at
1.5 billion by 2020.
CONCLUSION
China’s political turmoil during the 20th century provides a rich focus
for analysis. The population history of China during the second half of the
last century reflects strong state interventions in the lives of its citizens.
Some Chinese policies were directed at affecting population growth through
regulating marriage and fertility—but this analysis makes it clear that in
many cases, policies not intended to influence fertility nonetheless affected
individuals, in their access to resources, their ability to marry, and their
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ability to raise well-nourished children. Of the fluctuations in age-specific
fertility, and birth and death rate analyzed here, few are responses to forces
we commonly consider ‘‘environment’’ (e.g., the earthquake in Hebei);
more frequent and dramatic are the responses to political decisions not even
aimed at fertility and mortality. Political decisions are thus, in fact, an
‘‘environmental’’ force that must be analyzed in many cases.
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